The $5 Wrench Attack

Cryptography can't defeat a $5 wrench. If someone threatens your life, you will give them your password. You should. Money is replaceable; you are not.

But what if you could have a believable "decoy" or a system that alerts help automatically?

Why a decoy can increase danger

A secondary wallet may fail to persuade an attacker, reveal that other wallets exist or encourage escalating demands. Device history, exchange records and public-chain analysis can contradict the decoy. Advice suitable for one person can be dangerous for another.

Prioritise life over assets. Reduce public exposure, avoid carrying unnecessary signing capability, separate long-term holdings from travel devices, and seek specialist personal-security advice for credible threats.

ZeroLatch is not a panic button

ZeroLatch check-ins begin at 1 day and can omit the additional safety period, but lifecycle processing runs daily. It has no SOS button, live location, man-down detection, police dispatch or human alarm centre. It is therefore unsuitable for kidnapping, same-day duress or travel safety.

It can hold longer-term continuity instructions for an authorised recipient after sustained absence. Keep urgent contacts, travel plans and emergency mechanisms in a system designed for immediate response, and never describe silence alone as proof of coercion.

Separate asset continuity from personal safety

The personal-safety plan should specify who monitors an overdue check-in, how identity and location are confirmed, who may contact authorities and how a false alarm is cancelled. The asset plan should specify custody, authority and recovery without requiring a threatened person to perform a secret action.

Review both with qualified advisers. A clever decoy that has never been tested under realistic conditions can create confidence without reducing risk.